Two-level Game Analysis for International Trade Regime and Political Support Function

2020 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 17K03585
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: International relations
• Research Institution: Kobe University
• Principal Investigator: Ishiguro Kaoru 神戸大学, 経済学研究科, 名誉教授 (20184509)
• Project Period (FY): 2017-04-01 – 2021-03-31
• Keywords: 国際貿易レジーム / 政治的支持関数 / ２レベルゲーム

Outline of Final Research Achievements

I theoretically have examined whether a US-Japan trade agreement would be beneficial as a buffer in the US-China trade war. To mitigate US protectionism, there is a “domestic pressure effect to suppress external pressure,” which results from Japanese protectionist political pressure to suppress the negative impacts of US tariff increases on Japan’s political support function, as well as a “free trade agreement (FTA) effect” in the US-Japan trade agreement. In the absence of a US-Japan trade agreement, both Japan and China’s political support functions decrease when the US raises tariffs. By contrast, when an FTA is signed between Japan and the US, an increase in US tariffs causes the Chinese political support function to decrease, while the Japanese political support function increases. The US-Japan trade agreement thus plays a role in mitigating the negative effects of the US-China trade war on Japan.

Free Research Field

国際政治経済学

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

本研究の学術的な意義は以下の点にある。米国や中国のような大国間の貿易戦争において日本のような第三国が締結する貿易レジーム（Free Trade Agreement: FTA）が、第三国の政治的支持関数に及ぼす影響について検討している点である。FTAの締結は、貿易戦争当事国の第三国に課す最適関税率の相違をもたらし、貿易削減効果や貿易転換効果に影響を及ぼす。第三国を含む貿易戦争のモデルを構築し、貿易戦争において最適関税率や貿易レジームの相違が第3国の貿易や政治的支持関数に及ぼす影響を分析した研究はこれまで存在しない。