2019 Fiscal Year Annual Research Report
Better foundations for better social institutions - theory and experiments
Project/Area Number |
17K03634
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Research Institution | Waseda University |
Principal Investigator |
Veszteg Robert 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (30597753)
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Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
船木 由喜彦 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (50181433)
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Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
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Keywords | experiments / matching / bargaining / decentralized markets / unstructured interaction / fairness / stability |
Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
Our aim is to understand how people search for a partner (matching problem) and how they split certain joint benefits (bargaining problem). During this final year, we have published some of our results in two international peer-reviewed publications.
In terms of behavior, we have observed important deviations from what most theoretical models assume. In matching problems, individual myopic rationality (decisions that improve upon the status quo, without being the overall best) dominates on decentralized markets, and centralized solutions (introduced to solve market failures) are typically unable to induce the intended outcomes as only a small fraction of decision-makers act strategic situation. The behavior that violates some "standard" axioms (e.g., theoretical solution concepts rely on.
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