2017 Fiscal Year Research-status Report
Experimentation in Organizations
| Project/Area Number |
17K13699
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
陳 珈惠 京都大学, 経済研究所, 助教 (20768238)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
|
| Keywords | experimentation / bandit problem |
|---|
| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
1. I worked on "An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition" with Junichiro Ishida and Arjit Mukherjee. This paper provides a dynamic game of market entry to better understand the emergence of a market pioneer and its welfare implications. Our model features market competition and private learning about the uncertain market condition. We identify a condition for the first-mover advantage to dominate and show that the emergence of a market pioneer is generally welfare-enhancing.
2. “Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines: The Role of Commitment,” with Junichiro Ishida is accepted for publication in Journal of Industrial Economics.
3. “Hierarchical Experimentation,” with Junichiro Ishida is under revision at Journal of Economic Theory.
|
| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
I have finished the analysis for the first paper. In the following year, I will attend conferences to present the results. Moreover, I will also proceed to work on the next topic.
|
| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
In the remaining years, I will continue to work on how difference in individual traits and characteristics among agents shape the innovation process and the optimal way to motivate innovation. Particular attention is paid to the situation where agents are uncertain not only about the project quality, but also about his own innate ability or skill to implement the project. I will also incorporate signaling into innovation process to investigate how incentives to signal one's ability affect the choices of projects and persistence in experimentation.
|
