2019 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Experimentation in Organizations
| Project/Area Number |
17K13699
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
Chen Chia-Hui 京都大学, 経済研究所, 准教授 (20768238)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
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| Keywords | experimentation / bandit problem |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Innovation is a consequence of a process that are both collective and dynamic, involving decisions of various individuals at different stages. This project provides an analytical framework for this complex process to shed light on how radical innovations are developed and materialized in organizations, as well as how the collective incentive to experiment with new ideas is shaped by organizational factors. The paper "Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines: The Role of Commitment" was published in Journal of Industrial Economics, and the paper "Hierarchical Experimentation" was published in Journal of Economic Theory in 2018. The paper "A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players" is forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics, and papers "An Entry Game with Learning and Market Competition" and "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation" are under submission.
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| Free Research Field |
dynamic games with incomplete information
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
This project provides new insights and implications that help us better understand how innovations are motivated and generated in a complex organizational environment. Understanding the internal organizational structure of innovation is also crucial for deriving policy implications.
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