Political Economy of Cabinet Termination: Political Agency Problem under the Parliamentary System

2020 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 17K13755
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Waseda University
• Principal Investigator: Asako Yasushi 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 准教授 (70634757)
• Project Period (FY): 2017-04-01 – 2021-03-31
• Keywords: 政治的エージェンシー問題 / 議院内閣制 / 内閣不信任決議 / モラルハザード / 逆選択

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This project investigates the effect of a possible risk of cabinet termination on political agency problem (moral hazard and adverse selection). First, the possibility of cabinet termination can incentivize a prime minister or government to increase their efforts. Consequently, this may reduce the related moral hazard problems. Second, the possibility of cabinet termination can improve the quality of governance. This is because a prime minister or government exhibiting undesirable characteristics such as low competence to their voters should be dismissed through the cabinet termination. Thus, a more competent government is more likely to survive.

Free Research Field

政治経済学、応用ゲーム理論

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

本研究の主要な学術的貢献は主に以下の3点である。第一に、今まで着目されてこなかった議院内閣制における政治的エージェンシー問題（モラルハザードおよび逆選択問題）を分析する理論的枠組みを提示したこと。第二に、内閣不信任決議や倒閣運動に関しての理解の深化を行ったこと。特に過去の理論研究では、内閣信任決議は政治的安定性をもたらす点などが指摘されてきた一方で、内閣不信任決議や倒閣運動に関してはあまり分析されてこなかった。第三に、議院内閣制下における制度の違いなどをふまえつつ、より良い政治制度に導くための指針の提示を行っていること。