2020 Fiscal Year Research-status Report
Artificial Intelligence, Price Setting Strategies and Antitrust Law: Towards a Regulatory Framework
| Project/Area Number |
18K01300
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
VAN・UYTSEL S 九州大学, 法学研究院, 准教授 (30432842)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2018-04-01 – 2022-03-31
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| Keywords | algorithmic collusion / hub-and-spoke cartel / cartel facilitator / horizontal shareholding / common shareholding / kansei dango / vertical cartel |
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| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
The research has proceeded along two prongs. On the one hand, the research has investigated how the same investors take a stake in the same internet startups using algorithms for price setting. Our research has revealed that many investors in such startups are the same. This will create the issue of common or horizontal shareholding, which in turn could lead to several competition law issues. Currently, we have identified that tempering innovation, either through horizontal collusion or forced merger, and higher price setting of products or services are the most resplendent problems. On the other hand, we have researched the possibility to apply domestics competition laws to algorithmic collusion. Due to the conceptualization of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, for example, we have argued that the unreasonable restraint article of the AMA may not be applicable to most types of algorithmic collusion. The reason: the difficult relation of the AMA with cartel facilitators. However, it may be argued that the unfair trade practice of conditional dealing could be applied. Other jurisdictions, like India, has also problems to apply its competition law to algorithmic collusion.
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| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
3: Progress in research has been slightly delayed.
Reason
The research has a slight delay because the principal investigator elaborated on the issue of horizontal shareholding in Asian fintech firms. This issue is important because the presence of the same shareholders behind the firms that are using algorithms for price setting could facilitate the collusion of the algorithms. For example, the shareholders could instigate the buying of the same algorithms among the firms they control. Or, the shareholders could pass other information that is critical in the price setting process, which could lead to price fixing.
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| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
The further plan for the research is to focus finalize the manuscript of the book "Algorithmic Collusion and Competition Law", for which the principal investigator has a contract with Edward Elgar. This book envisions to provide more theoretical and experimental research on algorithmic collusion. Further, the book will also include contributions on how China, Europe, Australia, India and Japan are able to tackle competition law problems with algorithmic collusion.
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| Causes of Carryover |
Covid-19 related problems has delayed the finalization of one more book. The cost for the native check had therefore to be postponed to the next fiscal year. The money carried over will therefore be used to do the native check of the final chapters of the book "Algorithmic Collusion and Competition Law" (Steven Van Uytsel, Salil Mehra and Yoshiteru Uemura, eds.) to be published by Edward Elgar.
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| Remarks |
Change of the conference website URL (Conference on Collusion, Algorithms and Competition Law - 23 November 2019)
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Research Products
(10 results)
