2023 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Optimal Auction Designs of Competing Sellers
| Project/Area Number |
18K12738
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
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| Research Institution | Otaru University of Commerce |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2018-04-01 – 2024-03-31
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| Keywords | Auction Design / Competing Sellers / Revenue Cap |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We studied a new auction design to encourage participation of potential bidders when a single seller sells an individual item. When the number of potential bidders is small and the participation cost is high, such as the pre-project survey cost, we found that setting a sufficiently low minimum bid is not optimal. In those cases, it is optimal for the seller to set an upper limit on her revenue (revenue-cap) in order to ensure the sufficient participation. The revenue-cap is implemented in two ways: (1) by introducing a maximum bid with no minimum bid, or (2) by introducing a minimum bid and allocating the item to a randomly selected bidder if there are no bids above the minimum bid.
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| Free Research Field |
ゲーム理論
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
研究結果から，公共調達案件ごとのパラメータを詳細に観測できれば，それに応じた社会的に最適な入札者数を確保するためのオークション設計を行うことが理論的には可能になった．現在の日本においては十分な入札者を確保できない公共調達オークション案件が多数存在している．この研究はそのような問題を解決するために役立つことが予測される．今後はこの理論結果を実際に社会に実装するための具体的なオークション設計についても研究していきたい．また，売り手が複数存在し，それら売手間の潜在的入札社の奪い合いといった競争がある場合にも理論結果を拡張していきたい．
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