2021 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Disclosure policy for relative performance indicators under product market competition
| Project/Area Number |
18K12909
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 07100:Accounting-related
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| Research Institution | Momoyama Gakuin University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2018-04-01 – 2022-03-31
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| Keywords | 相対的業績評価 / 開示戦略 / 委任ゲーム / 非協力ゲーム理論 / 寡占競争市場 / 業績評価 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this study, we investigate whether it is optimal for firms facing oligopolistic competitive markets to disclose their weights in relative performance evaluation to their competitors. From our analysis, we demonstrate that, depending on whether the competition taking place in the market, optimal decision-making of disclosure is different. In addition, in recent years, one can infer that disclosure policy of management's performance evaluation systems has become one of the key focal points for regulatory considerations. In this study, we also focus on this issue and analyze how firms' disclosure strategies affect total surplus. As a result, we demonstrate that under quantity competition, it is desirable to disclose as much as possible, whereas under price competition, the disclosure of performance evaluation systems has negative consequences for total surplus.
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| Free Research Field |
会計学
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
本研究は、企業の業績評価方法の開示が企業にとって最適かどうか、また社会にとって良い結果をもたらすかを分析している。したがって、本研究の分析結果は、ケースごとに合わせた企業の最適な意思決定に関する示唆を与えるといえる。また、それだけでなく、市場や企業が直面する状況に応じて、経営者の業績評価方法を開示することが社会にとっては最適でないことを示している。そのため、一方的に経営者の業績評価方法を開示する法改正を行なうことが、必ずしも社会にとって良い成果をもたらすとは限らないことを示唆している。以上から、企業の意思決定だけでなく、企業の開示情報に関する規制を議論している点で社会的な意義があるといえる。
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