2010 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Auction Design in Behavioral Economics-Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Markets and Human Nature.
| Project/Area Number |
19330041
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Shinshu University |
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Principal Investigator |
NISHIMURA Naoko Shinshu University, 経済学部, 教授 (30218200)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SAIJO Tatsuyoshi 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (20205628)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2010
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| Keywords | オークション / ゲーム理論 / 制度設計 / 社会的選好 / スパイト / 実験 |
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| Research Abstract |
There are four basic auction formats which are known to generate the equivalent expected revenue. This revenue equivalence, however, has not been supported by laboratory experiments. We propose to solve this anomaly by introducing the possibility of buyers being reciprocally spiteful. We show that in the face of the reciprocal buyers, spiteful buyer can not make a bold overbid so that the resulted equilibrium set is efficient and much smaller with lower prices compared to the case of conventional model with self-regarding buyers. In our model, we can rank these four auction formats in terms of their performance, which is consistent with their usage frequency.
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