2009 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Collective action for local commons management: A comparative study of Japan and China
| Project/Area Number |
19380132
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Agro-economics
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| Research Institution | Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries |
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Principal Investigator |
ITO Junichi Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 上席主任研究官 (80356302)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
FUJIE Takeshi 滋賀大学, 環境総合研究センター, 准教授 (40356316)
ONIKI Shunji 独立行政法人国際農林水産業研究センター, 主任研究員 (60289345)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
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| Keywords | 農業経済学 / 資源経済学 / 計量経済学 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory, and verifies them empirically. Data for the analysis was collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. The agricultural Census was also used for the analysis of Japan. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in a rural community where few non-farm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity among water users is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. Also, the relationship between group size and collective action is ambiguously determined in our theoretical model, but there exists an inverse "U-shape" relationship. The fact that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention lends strong support to the frequently voiced view that governments or external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of CPRs to immediate stakeholders.
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