2010 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Research on Anticommons Problem
| Project/Area Number |
19530159
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Hosei University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2010
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| Keywords | アンチコモンズ / 規制 / 交渉 / 取引費用 |
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| Research Abstract |
The tragedy of the anticommons occurs when multiple owners have rights to exclude others from a scarce resource. The resource consequently tends to be underused. We can see many examples of anticommons and each of them has its own problem. Hence, we focus an example in the context of industrial organization and examine the problem theoretically by using game theory. Especially, we examine whether this "tragedy" can be mitigated when there is a government that regulates the prices by bargaining with firms, by considering bargaining cost explicitly.
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