2009 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Game theoretic analysis for collective choice problems and the strategy-proofness
| Project/Area Number |
19710135
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Social systems engineering/Safety system
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| Research Institution | Daito Bunka University |
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Principal Investigator |
UMEZAWA Masashi Daito Bunka University, 経営学部, 准教授 (20361305)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
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| Keywords | OR / 意思決定 / ゲーム理論 / 社会選択理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research is about collective choice rules that choose a subset of alternative set, given each individual's preference over the alternatives. If some individual can secure a single outcome that he prefers to the single outcome when he is honest by falsifying his preference, the procedure is manipulable. Nonmanipulable voting rules are called strategy-proof. In particular, this study focused on the strategy-proof collective choice rules. The main results show that Pareto rule is coalitionally strategy-proof in a max-min sense, and that the maximal rule with the coalitionally strategy-proofness and nonimposition property is the Pareto rule.
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