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2023 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Mechanism Design with Robustness and Admissibility

Research Project

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Project/Area Number 19K01557
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Section一般
Review Section Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
Research InstitutionHitotsubashi University (2022-2023)
Yokohama National University (2019-2021)

Principal Investigator

MUTO Nozomu  一橋大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 教授 (40706222)

Project Period (FY) 2019-04-01 – 2024-03-31
Keywordsメカニズムデザイン
Outline of Final Research Achievements

We consider implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single-object auction, the second-price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision problem, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to minimize deficit subject to efficiency. In the two-sided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information, the social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile, is implementable.

Free Research Field

メカニズムデザイン

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

支配されない戦略による遂行では、遂行のための十分条件は、既存文献において限られた形でしか知られていなかった。本研究では、扱いやすい形の十分条件を一般的な環境において提示し、その十分条件を典型的な経済環境に適用することで、古典的に知られた社会選択関数を上回る社会選択対応が存在することを示した。
この結果は、オークションやマッチングを含む応用領域にも有用であり、遂行のためにどのようなメカニズムが必要となるかに関する示唆を与えるものである。

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Published: 2025-01-30  

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