2011 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Strategy for cooperation and free-riding in a dynamic contribution game
| Project/Area Number |
20530156
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
MIYAGAWA Eiichi 神戸大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (10467673)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2011
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 公共財 |
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| Research Abstract |
This project studied a game where two individuals alternate in making contributions to a public good until their total cumulative contributions reach a required level. Unlike existing studies, we considered the case where individuals do not have complete information about the total amount the other individual is willing to pay for the public good. We succeeded in finding a game-theoretic equilibrium. When the required level of contributions is relatively small, we proved that no other equilibrium exists. We found that, in the equilibrium, the public good is completed only gradually. Completion may take a very long time even when the required level of contributions is small.
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