2009 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
A solution for the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design
| Project/Area Number |
20730129
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | University of Toyama |
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Principal Investigator |
MIZUKAMI Hideki University of Toyama, 経済学部, 准教授 (30377238)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2009
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / メカニズム・デザイン |
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| Research Abstract |
In implementation theory, it does not matter from the theoretical viewpoint that the designed mechanism has multiple equilibria, since those equilibrium outcomes coincide with the social goal by the definition of implementation. However, when those mechanisms are used in practice, the "equilibrium coordination problem" arises, i.e., how do agents decide which equilibrium to choose among those equilibria. Direct revelation mechanisms, which prevail recently, are simple enough to have multiple equilibria, so it is an important problem to solve the equilibrium coordination problem. This study shows that in a direct revelation mechanism, the truth-telling equilibrium tends to be selected among multiple equilibria by economic experiments. It turns out that if a mechanism with multiple equilibria has the truth-telling equilibrium, the equilibrium coordination problem could be resolve.
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