2009 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
The design of international public goods provision mechanisms that are most robust against the free-riding behavior of non-participants
Project/Area Number |
20730135
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic theory
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Research Institution | Osaka University |
Principal Investigator |
WAKAYAMA Takuma Osaka University, 経済学部, 講師 (80448654)
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Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2009
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Keywords | 経済理論 / ゲーム理論 / メカニズムデザイン |
Research Abstract |
In this project, I studied the design of international public goods provision mechanisms that are most robust against the free-riding behavior of non-participants. Concretely, I first examined equilibrium participation probabilities in the voluntary contribution mechanism and in any Pareto efficient mechanism. Next, I numerically compared the voluntary contribution mechanism with the Pareto efficient mechanism and studied the design of international public goods provision mechanisms that are applicable in a wide range of situations. Moreover, I conducted experimental study on the comparison between mechanisms.
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[Remarks] Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi, TakafumiYamakawa, Jun Shionozaki, Makoto Kato,Kenju Akai, Takuma Wakayama, TsutomuMurata, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo, “TheCognitive Processing of Altruisticand Spiteful Behavior: An fMRIStudy,"Working Paper EXP-SS-E-10,Osaka University, 2009.
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[Remarks] Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama, "Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets, "ISER Discussion Paper No. 727R, Osaka University, 2009.
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[Remarks] Toyotaka Sakai and Takuma Wakayama, "Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two, " ISER Discussion Paper No. 723, Osaka University, 2008.
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[Remarks] Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama, "Secure implementation: An alternative characterization, " Working Paper No. 238, University of Toyama, 2008.
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