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2022 Fiscal Year Annual Research Report

The experimental economics of decentralization

Research Project

Project/Area Number 20K01553
Research InstitutionWaseda University

Principal Investigator

Veszteg Robert  早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (30597753)

Project Period (FY) 2020-04-01 – 2023-03-31
Keywordsbargaining / cooperative bargaining / Nash bargaining solution / axioms / scale invariance
Outline of Annual Research Achievements

We have carried out a number of experiments on human decision-making investigating bargaining in an unstructured two-person setting. In sharp contrast to the large body of experimental research on similar problems, we have used a context-rich design and relied on cooperative bargaining theory for reference. We have collected data in Tokyo and in Paris. Surprisingly, our main results are identical across the two locations.

We have tested seven axioms that are frequently used in cooperative bargaining theory. Our data support strong efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity, and reject scale invariance. Also individual rationality and midpoint domination are violated by a significant fraction of agreements. In consequence, popular theoretical solutions that satisfy the rejected axioms, as the Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, perform poorly in the laboratory. The solution that best explains the data is the deal-me-out solution.

We have also checked whether bargaining is guided by utilities as assumed by the classic version of cooperative bargaining theory or rather by comparisons in observables as often assumed in empirical work and by behavioral models. Our data show that scale invariance is supported when the relevant information is only privately known and when rescaling only affects the extreme points of the utility scale. Scale invariance is not supported when rescaling affects the units on the utility scale. Overall, we find scarce empirical support to classic theoretical bargaining solutions based on unobservables.

  • Research Products

    (4 results)

All 2022 Other

All Int'l Joint Research (1 results) Journal Article (1 results) (of which Int'l Joint Research: 1 results,  Peer Reviewed: 1 results) Presentation (2 results) (of which Int'l Joint Research: 1 results)

  • [Int'l Joint Research] Universite de Rennes(フランス)

    • Country Name
      FRANCE
    • Counterpart Institution
      Universite de Rennes
  • [Journal Article] Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes2022

    • Author(s)
      Takeuchi Ai、Veszteg Robert F.、Kamijo Yoshio、Funaki Yukihiko
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: 134 Pages: 169~198

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.016

    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
  • [Presentation] On scale invariance: What do bargainers bargain about?2022

    • Author(s)
      Veszteg Robert Ferenc
    • Organizer
      ESA (Economic Science Association) North American Meeting 2022
    • Int'l Joint Research
  • [Presentation] On scale invariance: What do bargainers bargain about?2022

    • Author(s)
      Veszteg Robert Ferenc
    • Organizer
      Experimental Social Science Conference

URL: 

Published: 2023-12-25  

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