Explaining Nuclear Policies Through Political Institutions and Economic Rents

2023 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 20K13428
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Review Section: Basic Section 06020:International relations-related
• Research Institution: Tokyo Metropolitan University
• Principal Investigator: Ohtsuki Kazuto 東京都立大学, 大学教育センター, 准教授 (00779093)
• Project Period (FY): 2020-04-01 – 2024-03-31
• Keywords: 核抑止 / 大量破壊兵器 / 戦争 / 核兵器

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Our theoretical and empirical analysis using a mathematical model and survey experiments demonstrated that the "robust mutual commitment to retaliation" assumed in traditional deterrence theory is not often observed among nuclear states. Instead, the certainty of deterrence varies depending on political institutions and the contested goods. The goods are broadly categorized into those that benefit all citizens, like security, and private goods like economic resources. We found that political regimes (democratic or non-democratic) influence leaders' commitment to securing these goods. The results were presented at several academic conferences.

Free Research Field

政治学

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

ロシアやイスラエルの軍事作戦により、核戦争が再びアクチュアルな問題として議論されるようになっている。ロシアの例はまさに非民主国家が所有する核の戦争抑止効果に関して人々が直感的に抱いていた不安に光を当てるものとなった。核兵器の拡散が進み、また、核保有国が戦争の当事者となる現在の国際情勢を受けて、具体的な政策提言の必要が高まっている中、本研究は様々な政治体制下での核武装の潜在的なリスクと国際安全保障への影響を理解するための重要な基盤を提供すると考える。