On the possibility of designing desirable mechanisms for assigning public goods

2022 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 20K13462
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Review Section: Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
• Research Institution: Kwansei Gakuin University
• Principal Investigator: TAMURA Shohei 関西学院大学, 経済学部, 講師 (10802035)
• Project Period (FY): 2020-04-01 – 2023-03-31
• Keywords: メカニズムデザイン / 公共財

Outline of Final Research Achievements

In this research, I explored the possibility of designing desirable mechanisms for assigning public goods among multiple communities using the framework of mechanism design. In particular, I considered several axioms as desirable properties of mechanisms, and characterized the set of mechanisms satisfying all the axioms. Through the analysis, I found that the set includes only one mechanism that has not been proposed in related research.

Free Research Field

メカニズムデザイン

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

本研究により、現実社会の同様の状況において、制度運営者が本研究で用いた公理を制度の望ましい性質として重要視するならば、導出された制度を用いて公共財の割当を決定することが唯一の選択肢となることが示唆されるため、制度設計における指針を与えることができたと考える。