2022 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Implementation problems with irrational agents under the repeated setting
| Project/Area Number |
20K22110
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Review Section |
0107:Economics, business administration, and related fields
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| Research Institution | Osaka University of Economics |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2020-09-11 – 2023-03-31
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| Keywords | メカニズムデザイン / ソロモン王のジレンマ / 資源配分問題 / 再交渉 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The following three studies are conducted.
The first is a theoretical study on the problem of allocating a perfectly divisible good with renegotiation. The study proposes a new game to strategically justify the constrained equal awards rule. The second is a study to characterize how social goals can be achieved when each of the two equilibrium concepts represents agents' behavior under incomplete information. The third is an experimental study of King Solomon's dilemma which is considered the problem of allocating an indivisible good. In the study, the existence of bounded rational individuals is allowed. A performance comparison of the two mechanisms is analyzed.
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| Free Research Field |
理論経済学
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
従来の権利付き完全分割財配分問題に関する研究では，１期においてのみ考えていた．しかし，現実的には１期だけでなく，同じ問題が繰り返し起こることが多い．この点に関して，１度だけで交渉が終わるのではなく，再交渉を許すゲームを用いて理論研究を進めた点に学術的意義がある．
従来の遂行問題に関する研究では，誰もが自身の好みを最大限満たすように行動できると仮定してきた． しかし，そのような行動を目指しても上手くできない限定合理的な個人が多く観察されてきた．この点を考慮した上で実験研究を進め，理論で考えられてきたメカニズムよりも性能が良いメカニズムを設計・観察した点に，学術的意義がある．
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