2011 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Mechanism design of matching agreements on global environmental issues
| Project/Area Number |
21530226
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Keywords | 国際環境協定 / マッチング / ゲーム理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
I have extended my own previous researches concerning the effectiveness of matching agreements on global environmental issues in two directions. First, in the case of asymmetric countries, there exists a matching rule where the efficient agreement is self-enforcing just as the symmetric case. Second, the efficiency and the self-enforcement can be satisfied at the same time when we consider the interdependencies between the actions of signatories and those of non-signatories by allowing the existence of countries that do not commit to the matching. Thus, matching agreements have turned out to be effective in more realistic frameworks
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