2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Economic Analysis of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions
| Project/Area Number |
21530231
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Atomi University |
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Principal Investigator |
TANNO Tadanobu 跡見学園女子大学, マネジメント学部, 准教授 (40282933)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2012
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| Keywords | オークション / 公共調達 / カルテル / 共謀 / 官製談合 / 非対称オークション / 最適オークション / 情報の非対称性 / 封印オークション / 入札制度 / 官製談合防止法 / 予定価格 |
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| Research Abstract |
The research has done the general analysis in bid-rigging in procurement auctions. In asymmetric auctions related to bid-rigging, we compared revenues and efficiency in terms of a degree of asymmetry. The empirical analysis usingpublic works data in a municipality was first analysis in city officials’ involvement of the bid rigging. The main conclusion is that in the city officials’ involvement of the bid rigging, backlogs of bidding firms positively influences their bid rates. The examination of Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s recommendation showed the existence of some boom of cartel.
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