2011 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
| Project/Area Number |
21653016
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
AOYAGI Masaki 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (50314430)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2011
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
For the success of a mechanism, it is important that it is credible in the sense that it leaves no room for the designer to manipulate the outcome after he acquires information. In this project, we studied credibility criteria in(1) a sales mechanism employed by a monopolist seller of a good whose value depends on the aggregate consumption level, and(2) an information policy of a government which determines the quality of its private signal about the risk of a shock and then discloses it to the public to induce their action.
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