2010 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Market Design in Dynamic Models
| Project/Area Number |
21730157
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
OGAWA Ryo Osaka University, 社会経済研究所, 講師 (50533204)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2010
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| Keywords | オークション / メカニズムデザイン / 契約理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
In this project, I analyzed the role of incentive problems in various dynamic models based on game theory and economics of information. Specifically, I present a new approach for the optimal design problem of dynamic competition between multiple agents, such as promotion contests in an organization which lasts for long periods. Also I conducted theoretical analyses on the sequential auction in Japanese flower markets as well as a new effect in dynamic moral hazard problems with persistence.
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