2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Payoff Allocation Problem in Patent Pools: Coalition Formation, Investment in Development, and Efficiency
| Project/Area Number |
21730183
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | University of Tsukuba |
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Principal Investigator |
WATANABE Naoki 筑波大学, システム情報系, 准教授 (20378954)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2012
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| Keywords | 交渉解 / 提携構造 / 寡占 |
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| Research Abstract |
Shapley value is the most popular solution concept in payoff allocation problems. In the real markets, however, there are many firms that use technologies that are not licensed via patent pools, and thus we need to consider the properties of Shapley values for the games with coalition structures because it is more appropriate solution concept for the payoff allocation problem in patent pool. The most important result of this research was, although it is not the analysis of patent pool itself, that we found some situations where the Shapley values for games with coalition structures is not implemented as stable bargaining outcomes. Experiments of auctions and weighted voting were also conducted for a situation where payoff allocation is determined via such mechanisms.
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Research Products
(14 results)
