2010 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Mechanism design in fair allocation problems
Project/Area Number |
21830090
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic theory
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Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology (2010) Tokyo Metropolitan University (2009) |
Principal Investigator |
HOSHINO Yuji (FUJINAKA Yuji) 東京工業大学, 大学院・社会理工学研究科, 助教 (20552277)
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Project Period (FY) |
2009 – 2010
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Keywords | メカニズムデザイン / ナッシュ遂行 / 耐戦略性 / 公平分担問題 / 非分割財 |
Research Abstract |
In this project, I studied mechanisms that implement fair allocations in the problem of allocating indivisible goods with monetary transfers, which are referred to as the fair allocation problems. Concretely, I investigated properties of a simple mechanism in the problem with a single object. Next, in the problem where there are multiple indivisible objects, I examined which welfare level each participant to a mechanism can obtain by maximally manipulating the mechanism. This analysis leads to various meaningful results on mechanisms in this problem.
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[Remarks] Yuji Fuinaka, Toyotaka Sakai, and Shin Sakaue "Choosing someone with monetary transfers : a comprehensive analysis,"(2010) mimeo.ディスカッションペーパー
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[Remarks] Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama,"Maximal manipulation in fair allocation,"(2011) Discussion Paper 2011-02, Department of Social Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology)ディスカッションペーパー
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