2023 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Socially responsible investment: ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining?
| Project/Area Number |
21K01559
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 07060:Money and finance-related
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
Adachi-Sato Meg 神戸大学, 経済経営研究所, ジュニアリサーチフェロー (20813471)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2021-04-01 – 2024-03-31
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| Keywords | SRI / ESG / Multitask / Holdup / Incomplete contracts / Social impact bonds / Unverifiable output |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This paper shows how a socially and environmentally aware firm principal can motivate a profit-oriented manager to pursue positive environmental, social, and governance (ESG) outcomes. In the model, the manager produces a verifiable output that is detrimental to ESG but also engages in an unverifiable output that promotes ESG. I show that an ex-post bargaining contract is preferred to an ex-ante commitment contract if the unverifiable output substantially improves ESG or if there is a large negative externality. The paper also demonstrates how social impact bonds can be more effective than short-term debt when used to finance social programs. This paper also highlight the difference between the green bonds and the social impact bonds.
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| Free Research Field |
Corporate Finance/Governance
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
長短期の報酬契約を用いて投資家が経営者に契約不可能な成果(その成果が負の外部性を減らしESGに貢献する)に結びつく努力をする事を動機づけられるかを理論的に研究した最初の論文であり、短期で報酬の交渉をするような契約の方が、負の外部性を減らすような努力を経営者に促す事ができる一方で、長期報酬契約はそのような努力をする誘因を奪うものの利益最大化につながる努力を促す、という結果を得た。立証不可能なESG成果というホット・トピックを扱った論文で、既存文献に貢献している。更に、本モデルはプロジェクト遂行者＝投資家となるようなSocial impact bondにも適用でき、現在の金融市場にも貢献している。
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