Theories, experiments, and applications of mechanism design

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 22330061
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• Allocation Type: Single-year Grants
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Osaka University
• Principal Investigator: SERIZAWA SHIGEHIRO 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (90252717)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): AOYAGI Masaki 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (50311430) ; WAKAYAMA Takuma 龍谷大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (80448654)
• Project Period (FY): 2010-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: メカニズム・デザイン / 耐戦略性 / 経済実験 / オークション / 誘因両立性 / 非分割財

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We analyzed strategy-proof rules in various model such as public alternative models, private goods allocation models, matching models, etc. Here, strategy-proofness means that society members have incentive to reveal their true private information, that is, it is a dominant strategy for each agent to reveal his true preference. Especially, we showed that (i) the minimum price Walrasian rule is the unique rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) the outcome of the simultaneous ascending auction coincides the allocation given by the minimum price Walrasian rule. The simultaneous ascending auction is employed in many countries to allocate frequency licenses. Our analysis supports this auction.

Free Research Field

社会科学、ミクロ経済学、ゲーム理論、メカニズム・デザイン、社会選択論