2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Incentive Design In Lawyer Social Role over Legal Access
| Project/Area Number |
22530012
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Fundamental law
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| Research Institution | Kumamoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
ZASU Yoshinobu 関西大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (40403216)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2012
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| Keywords | 上訴 / Adversary System |
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| Research Abstract |
Firstly, we analyzed the effect of deterrence of punitive damages. Especially, we addedthe adversary system model to previous studies. As a result, we showed the case that itis not able to deter harmful activities in punitive damages system. Secondly, we analyzedthe behavior of self-interest Judge theoretically in the appeal system. We showed thecase that the self-interest (his reputation and career) Judges tend to make anappeal-proof judicial decision.
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