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2011 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

Designing practical mechanisms for indivisible good allocation

Research Project

  • PDF
Project/Area Number 22730158
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionKeio University (2011)
Yokohama National University (2010)

Principal Investigator

SAKAI Toyotaka  慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (50404976)

Project Period (FY) 2010 – 2011
Keywordsメカニズムデザイン / 社会的選択 / 非分割財
Research Abstract

In indivisible good economies such as auction or matching, we studied the problem of designing economic mechanisms。For example, in an auction model without the quasi-linearity assumption on preferences, we offered an(axiomatic) characterization of second price auctions on the basis of equity and strategy-proofness。Furthermore, we characterized a rule that is stable and one-sided strategy-proof rule in a matching model。We also characterized the uniform rule on the basis of a weak version of strategy-proofness in allotment economies。In our discussions, we weakened various assumptions or conditions to obtain practical mechanisms.

  • Research Products

    (6 results)

All 2012 2011 2010 Other

All Journal Article (2 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 2 results) Presentation (3 results) Remarks (1 results)

  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proofness、tops-only、and the uniform rule2012

    • Author(s)
      Sakai, T. and Wakayama, T
    • Journal Title

      Theory and Decision

      Volume: Vol.72 Pages: 287-301

    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts2011

    • Author(s)
      Sakai, T
    • Journal Title

      Review of Economic Design

      Volume: Vol.15 Pages: 337-342

    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Presentation] An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear2012

    • Author(s)
      坂井豊貴
    • Organizer
      Waseda Conference and Lectures on Game Theory and Mechanism Design
    • Place of Presentation
      早稲田大学
    • Year and Date
      2012-03-21
  • [Presentation] An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear2012

    • Author(s)
      坂井豊貴
    • Organizer
      First Symposium on Mechanism Design and Social Choice
    • Place of Presentation
      慶應義塾大学
    • Year and Date
      2012-01-20
  • [Presentation] Impartial welfare orderings in infinite time horizon2010

    • Author(s)
      坂井豊貴
    • Organizer
      DCコンファレンス
    • Place of Presentation
      関西学院大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-09-17
  • [Remarks]

    • URL

      http://www.geocities.jp/toyotaka_sakai/

URL: 

Published: 2013-07-31  

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