2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Equilibrium Coordination in the Implementation Problem: Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?
| Project/Area Number |
22730160
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Aoyama Gakuin University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2012
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 遂行理論 / メカニズム・デザイン |
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| Research Abstract |
In implementation theory, it does not matter from the theoretical viewpoint that the designed mechanism has multiple equilibria, since those equilibrium outcomes coincide with the social goal by definition. However, when those mechanisms are used in practice, the "equilibrium coordination problem" arises, i.e., how do agents decide which equilibrium to choose among those equilibria. Direct revelation mechanisms, which prevail recently, are simple enough to have multiple equilibria. So, it is an important problem to solve the equilibrium coordination problem. This study shows by economic experiments that in a direct revelation mechanism, if the mechanism which has multiple equilibria has the truth-telling equilibrium, the equilibrium is salient among thoseequilibria. This implies that the truth-telling equilibrium could become a focal point (Schelling (1960)).
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