2011 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
On possibility of constructing social choice functions which are nonmanipulable by preferences adjacent to the sincere ones
Project/Area Number |
22730167
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic theory
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Research Institution | Fukuoka University |
Principal Investigator |
SATO Shin 福岡大学, 経済学部, 講師 (60458924)
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Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2011
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Keywords | ミクロ経済学 |
Research Abstract |
The possibility of constructing rules which do not give agents an incentive to misreport information on preferences in social choices is one of the most important topics in microeconomics. In this research, I propose a new property of rules, called"AM-proofness", which prevents agents from misreporting their preferences, and find logical relationship to"strategy-proofness"which has played a central role in the earlier researches.
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Research Products
(5 results)