2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Empirical analysis on collusion in public auctions
Project/Area Number |
22730204
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Applied economics
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Research Institution | Shiga University (2012-2015) Tokyo Metropolitan University (2010-2011) |
Principal Investigator |
Ishii Rieko 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (40456918)
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Project Period (FY) |
2010-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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Keywords | 応用計量経済学 / 入札 / 競争政策 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigated data from Japanese public auctions in order to see the effect of the market environment, the change in the auction system, and the existence of collusion on the bidding behavior. It is found that (1) bids are more rounded under collusion, (2) the bids are lower and the cancellation of submitting bids after the entry increases in online procurement auctions compared to the traditional auctions, and (3) the bidders are relatively symmetric in less competitive auctions.
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Free Research Field |
産業組織論
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