2023 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Morality as rational fiction and the limits of moralistic invervention
| Project/Area Number |
22K19958
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Review Section |
0101:Philosophy, art, and related fields
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| Research Institution | Mie University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2022-08-31 – 2024-03-31
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| Keywords | メタ倫理学 / 表出主義 / 錯誤論 / 懐疑論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Assuming error theory and/or moral skepticism, we investigate the possibility of morality as a kind of rational fiction. Though revolutionary expressivism, as an answer to the 'now-what' question, is promising in so far as we use it as a basis for such morality, expressivism itself is not theoretically viable unless the Frege=Geach problem can be solved. Our approach to the Frege=Geach problem is to generalize Allan Gibbard's semantics in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990), and Thinking How to Live (2003). First, while Gibbard essentially relies on the idea of hyperstates, we deem it unsatisfactory because it is psychologically unrealistic. Thus, we use states not necessarily maximal to construct expressivist semantics. Second, this generalization naturally gives rise to a variant of Beth model, which originally Evert Willem Beth proposed as an intuitionistic semantics. Third, based on Ian Rumfitt's falsificationism, we found how to recover classical logic in this semantics.
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| Free Research Field |
哲学
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
道徳というものが何か所与のものとして，疑うべからざるものとして受け入れられている現在，その道徳についての錯誤論（これは道徳が体系的に偽であるとする）や懐疑論（これは道徳について我々は何も知りえないとする）という「極端な」学説--むろんここで極端というのは偽であるとか疑わしいことを含意しない--に基づく，道徳の変容の可能性を示唆することは，現在の「モラリスティック」な社会においては，現行の実践について一定の反省的な考察，すなわち，畢竟我々にとって道徳は有益な役割を果たしているのかという問いを促すという点で意義あるものと思われる．
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