2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Political Economic Analysis of Coalition Formation and Institutional Building in International Governance
| Project/Area Number |
23330053
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
International relations
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
SUZUKI Motoshi 京都大学, 法学(政治学)研究科(研究院), 教授 (00278780)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
飯田 敬輔 東京大学, 大学院・法学政治学研究科, 教授 (00316895)
石黒 馨 神戸大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (20184509)
多湖 淳 神戸大学, 大学院・法学研究科, 准教授 (80457035)
岡田 章 一橋大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (90152298)
石田 淳 東京大学, 大学院・総合文化研究科, 教授 (90285081)
岩波 由香里 大阪市立大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 准教授 (40635447)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-01 – 2014-03-31
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| Keywords | 国際関係論 / 国際政治経済論 / 国際協力論 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research project has sought to analyze the problems of coalition formation and institutional building that are commonly observed in the realms of trade, money, peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation, global warming, etc. The problems are intrinsically intertwined with each other, hindering effective governance: a large coalition would be preferable in solving a global issue, but needs to be content with weak behavioral rules because it necessarily entails many heterogeneous members. A small coalition can create strong rules but is often ineffective in solving a global issue because it is simply too small. The research team, composed of political scientists and economists, have analyzed the problems by applying political theories of realism and constructivism and economic theories of rational choice and new institutionalism. Their analyses have illuminated the nature of the problems and uncovered appropriate institutional arrangements to reduce the dilemma.
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Research Products
(33 results)
