2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Toward designing collusion-proof combinatorial procurement mechanisms
| Project/Area Number |
23500184
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Intelligent informatics
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| Research Institution | The University of Electro-Communications (2013)
Kyushu University (2011-2012) |
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Principal Investigator |
IWASWAKI Atsushi 電気通信大学, 大学院情報システム学研究科, 准教授 (30380679)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
YOKOO Makoto 九州大学, システム情報科学研究院, 教授 (20380678)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 最適化 / メカニズムデザイン / オークション / 談合 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research project aims to models procurement auction mechanisms (rules or protocols) in the presence of a buyer and several (potentially) collusive bidders, propose a novel mechanism whose outcome is not affected through collusion (collusion-proof), and develop a technique for adjusting the performance. First, we extend a single-item auction mechanism to a multi-unit one where multiple identical items are sold and bidders may collude. This reveals that a collusion-proof mechanism is equivalent to the one that minimize buyer's payments in expectation. Second, we propose an alternative technology that automatically designs a mechanism via quantifier elimination and successfully construct a novel class of such a payment-minimizing mechanism for a restricted environment where a buyer is required to buy an item for sale. We further explore another case where sellers face the budget limits and find another class of desirable mechanisms.
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Research Products
(14 results)
