2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Centralization, Decentralization and Contingency Dependent Governance in the European Union: A Game Theoretical Analysis
| Project/Area Number |
23530383
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Hosei University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TSURANUKI Yoshihiro 法政大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70207447)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Keywords | ガバナンス / ゲーム理論 / 契約理論 / 公共経済学 / 政治経済学 / 欧州連合 / ユーロ圏 |
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| Research Abstract |
We used a Contract& Game Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of Eurozone Financial Governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. We derived the conditions for optimizing the EU's current allocation of authority, Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization, and found that what is effective is "contingency dependent governance" based on "relative sovereignty," where there is a division of authority as the basic structure and the main body governs the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency. We focused on how financial markets put pressure on the EU in the euro crisis and how this led the EU to build more robust institutions, and approached this by applying the Coase's theory of externalities. Further, applying the framework of an entry deterrence game conceptually, we analyzed how the EU, facing challenges from the markets, moved to build fiscal and monetary institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism.
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Research Products
(16 results)
