2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Measuring the Welfare Losses from Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
| Project/Area Number |
23730261
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Meiji Gakuin University (2012-2014)
Tezukayama University (2011) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
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| Keywords | 情報の非対称性 / 逆選択 / モラルハザード / 保険 / 厚生 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We have examined the role of asymmetric information in the real economy. We have measured how much inefficiency created by asymmetric information, and then explored the better policy. In the automobile insurance market, we estimated that the loss from adverse selection and/or moral hazard was 1,000 yen compared to the premium of 7,000 yen. In the credit guarantee scheme, we found that our data was consistent with adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses, and that the role of deductibles are effectively working, if not perfectly eliminate the inefficiency. In the annuity market, we obtained the results that the people with public pension live longer than those without, which is consistent with adverse selection story. We have also measured the loss from asymmetric information, but we are still working on it because our tentative estimates rely heavily on some strong assumptions.
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| Free Research Field |
経済学
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