2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Designing Robust Mechanisms and its Implications
| Project/Area Number |
23830024
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
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| Keywords | メカニズム / デザイン / 情報頑健性 |
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| Research Abstract |
The contributions of my research is decomposed into the following two projects.
(Subgame Perfect Implementation): We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as``information perturbations.’’ We show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations, truthful revelation does not occur and that in addition, the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes.
(Robust Virtual Implementatio): We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set of first-order beliefs of agents about payoff types. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out.
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