2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Game TheoreticAnalysis and Design of Multi-Object Auctions
| Project/Area Number |
23830039
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
SANO Ryuji 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 講師 (50611208)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
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| Keywords | 経済理論 / オークション |
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| Research Abstract |
I study auctions of multiple objects and multiple units, and investigate bidders’ incentive and equilibrium allocations in them. ``Combinatorial auctions’’ are those auctions in which bidders submit bids not only for individual objects but for combinations (or packages) of objects. In this research, I characterized a class of combinatorial auctions in which a particular strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium. In addition, I derived an equilibrium in an ascending-price auction that has recently been used in some applications.
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