2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
On the durability of Liberal Democracy : by the revision of Arrow's Theorem
Project/Area Number |
23830085
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Politics
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Research Institution | Waseda University |
Principal Investigator |
SAITO Nao 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手 (20612831)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
|
Keywords | デモクラシー論 / アローの定理 / リベラル・デモクラシー |
Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research is to verify negative implication of Arrow's general impossibility theorem in the theory of liberal democracy. Also, it is to protect liberal democracy from the theorem. The conclusion of this research is as follow; Arrow's theorem denies the possibility of usual democratic decision process like vote. Also, the theorem denies the possibility of decision process accompanied by a long-term commitment like social contract. However, social contract can be protected from Arrow's theorem both normatively and mathematically. This social contract, not the vote, bases durability of liberal democratic society.
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Research Products
(4 results)