2012 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
The effecitiveness of the unanimity rule with sequential voting when jurors are unfair.
| Project/Area Number |
23830087
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
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| Keywords | 順位決め / 逐次投票 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Research Abstract |
We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants (e.g., gymnastics competitions or competitive shows of crafts) whose the socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors. They may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show that sequential voting with open ballot instead of secret ballot, is effective as the jury's collective decision-making method to make the jury select the socially optimal ranking.
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