Toward solving social dilemma

2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24243028
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
• Allocation Type: Single-year Grants
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Kochi University of Technology
• Principal Investigator: Saijo Tatsuyoshi 高知工科大学, 経済・マネジメント学群, 教授 (20205628)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): 春野 雅彦 国立研究開発法人情報通信研究機構, 脳情報通信融合研究センター脳情報工学研究室, 研究マネージャー (40395124) ; 七條 達弘 大阪府立大学, 経済学研究科, 教授 (40305660) ; 小谷 浩示 高知工科大学, 経済・マネジメント学群, 教授 (80422583) ; 原 圭史郎 大阪大学, 工学研究科, 准教授 (30393036) ; 武田 裕之 大阪大学, 工学研究科, 講師 (00638512) ; 上須 道徳 大阪大学, COデザインセンター, 特任准教授(常勤) (50448099)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: 社会的ジレンマ / アプルーバル・メカニズム / 公共財供給ゲーム / 囚人のジレンマ / 準ジレンマ

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We designed mechanisms that implement cooperation in social dilemma games without using punishments. First, we found that the approval mechanism that allows an approval stage after a dilemma game implements cooperation using the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, but does not implement it using subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Second, the mechanism attains high cooperation rates from the first stage in experiments. Furthermore, the variants of the approval mechanism work very well in the class of quasi dilemma games including prisoner’s dilemma games and the public good provision games. Finally, we challenged to find solutions for dynamic dilemma games.

Free Research Field

制度設計