Enforsability of non-binding agreements - a game theoretic appproach

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24310110
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• Allocation Type: Partial Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Social systems engineering/Safety system
• Research Institution: Tokyo University of Science (2015-2016); Tokyo Institute of Technology (2012-2014)
• Principal Investigator: MUTO Shigeo 東京理科大学, 経営学部, 教授 (50126330)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): 大和 毅彦 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 教授 (90246778) ; 河崎 亮 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 准教授 (20579619) ; 坂東 桂介 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 助教 (50735412) ; 下村 研一 神戸大学, 経済経営研究所, 教授 (90252527) ; 岸本 信 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 助教 (00610560) ; イ チャンミン 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 助教 (50632436)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 安定集合 / 先見的安定集合 / 交渉ゲーム / 定常均衡 / 実験 / パレート最適性 / 制度設計 / 提携形成

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We first apply the farsighted set to economic/social systems like tarif negotiations between two countries, social dilemmas, negotations between sellers and buyers; and in most cases, we find that Pareto efficient outcomes are produced even without binding agreements if players behave with farsightedness. Furthermore even if players' farsighted behaviors are limited, we obtain the same result. Based on these results we design a mechanism in which players' farsighted behavior reach a Pareto efficient outcome even though agreements among them are not binding. We brush up the mechanism through experiments. These results are presented in the international conference held in Tokyo in August,2015.

Free Research Field

複合新領域