Formation, retention, and expansion of coalitions over groups: Application to convention for climate change

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24330078
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• Allocation Type: Partial Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Applied economics
• Research Institution: Kyoto University
• Principal Investigator: Imai Haruo 京都大学, 経済研究所, 研究員 (10144396)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): WATANABE Naoki 筑波大学, システム情報系, 准教授 (20378954) ; KUNIMOTO Takashi 一橋大学, 経済学研究科(院), 准教授 (40612271) ; HORI Kazumi 立命館大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60401668) ; OKADA Akira 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (90152298)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 交渉理論 / 提携形成 / ゲーム理論 / 気候変動問題 / 経済メカニズム

Outline of Final Research Achievements

As an alternative hypothesis to the dominant view that Kyoto protocol implies a coalition of developed countries assumes the responsibility to cut down emission levels of the GHG gases, we propose a possibility that others regarding preferences based on responsibility of historical emissions induce Kyoto protocol as an agreement of all. We also showed that the design of negotiation like Cancun Accord as well as Paris agreement, with setting a global emission target at a certain future date with each country’s obligation to be determined in the future may create a possibility of inefficiency. As more academic achievements, we showed the patterns of coalition formations and their consequences under voting schemes or other forms of bargaining, via variety of methods including the evolutionary game theory or econimic experiments and we also showed results concerning information and dynamics.

Free Research Field

応用経済学