Scoring auctions: game theoretic study and its application

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24530195
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Nagoya University
• Principal Investigator: HANAZONO Makoto 名古屋大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 准教授 (60362406)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): NAKABAYASHI Jun 東北大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 准教授 (30565792)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: 総合評価方式入札 / ゲーム理論 / 構造推定

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This study has contributed to the theory and applications in the basic studies of scoring auctions, in which a procurement buyer selects a supplier based on both price and quality of the procured project through a pre-announced scoring rule.
Our theory extends the scope of analysis in scoring auction. In particular, the scoring rules that the procurement buyer adopts can be quite general, such as price-per-quality ratio, fixed-price best proposal, and other nonlinear scoring rules.
We also develop the method of structural estimation for scoring auctions, and estimate the model using the auction data of public construction projects conducted by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan. We confirm that the data and the theoretical prediction are consistent.

Free Research Field

産業組織論