Theoretical analysis of governments competition for locating firms in the intermediate run

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24530255
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Applied economics
• Research Institution: Hiroshima University
• Principal Investigator: OKAMURA Makoto 広島大学, 社会(科)学研究科, 教授 (30177084)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): SHINKAI Tetsuya 関西学院大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40206313) ; OHKAWA Takao 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494) ; TOMODA Yasunobu 神戸市外国語大学, 外国語学部, 准教授 (30437280) ; OKUDA Mai 神奈川大学, 経済学部, 助教 (90711549)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: location / oligopoly / subsidy competition / intermediate run

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We publish two papers in international academic journals. One paper addresses the sustainability and stability problems of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments that aim to maximize tax revenues in a repeated game setting. This paper shows that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either if the number of countries in a coalition subgroup is smaller or if the number of existing countries in the entire economy is large. The other paper explores an optimal environmental tax policy in a three-stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants. We show not only that the optimal emission tax is non-decreasing with the declining cost of relocation but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country.

Free Research Field

応用ミクロ経済学