2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Political Economic Analysis of Strategic Delegation and the Provision of International Public Good
| Project/Area Number |
24530348
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Keywords | 戦略的委任 / 補完性 / 租税競争 / 地球環境問題 / 中位投票者定理 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I have analyzed the consequences of "strategic delegation", where citizens deliberately choose a delegate with different preferences from their own to pursue strategic advantages.I showed that the consequence of the strategic delegation crucially depends on complementarity. I also investigated the second-order condition of the obtained solutions and the emergence of asymmetric equilibria which were not studied in the previous researches.I also reexamined the work of the leadership in tax competition models. A previous paper showed that the leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium, in a model where the regional asymmetry translates into different gradients of the
demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts. By reversing the form of asymmetry with different vertical intercepts and identical gradients,I show that leadership by the large region becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become Pareto superior.
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| Free Research Field |
公共経済学
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