2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Experimental Investigations of Client Rejetion for Going Concern Reasons and Initial Public Offerings Concerns
| Project/Area Number |
24530578
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Meiji University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Keywords | 監査難民 / 新興企業 / 監査拒否 / ゲーム理論 / 経済実験 / 損害賠償責任 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of my research is to coduct experimental investigations on following client rejection issues based on the game theoretical settings. Big audit firms are reluctant to accept an audit offer from clients with going concern problems and it is small audit firms that accept this offer. Their independence is at stake. My research demonstrates that auditors with less market power don't compromise their independence, even if their clients are investment-averse. Client rejection leads to a huge economic loss and ultimately a market failure, through preventing high promising entrepreneurs from having access to capital markets. My research indicates that the stricteness of legal liability does not have much impact om client rejection nor investor's decision. Howerver, it suggests that the high frequency of the bad type entrepreneur should produce mutual defection between auditors and investors, that is, less frequent great effort at evaluationg clients and less frequent investment.
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| Free Research Field |
会計学 会計監査論
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