Design of a mechanism embedded in an economy

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24653048
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Osaka University
• Principal Investigator: AOYAGI MASAKI 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 (50314430)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: 価格提示メカニズム / 相互依存 / 社会学習 / タイミング / ネットワーク / 外部性 / 均衡

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This project studies the equilibrium of competition between firms that employ price-posting mechanisms to sell their goods. It analyzes a dynamic two-period model in which the value of the good of either firm to each buyer depends on his and other buyers’ private information, and another model in which the value of either good to each buyer depends on the adoption decisions of his neighbors. In the first model, the buyers may delay their purchase decisions to learn from the behavior of other buyers, and the possibility of the delay affects the firms’ pricing decisions. In the second model, the equilibrium prices may not equal the constant marginal cost of production depending on the specification if the externalities relationship among the buyers.

Free Research Field

理論経済学